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ABSTRACT
Over the past quarter century fertility has declined rapidly in many developing
countries. Projections typically assume that this trend will continue until the replacement
level is reached. However, recent evidence suggests that ongoing fertility declines may
have slowed or stalled in a number of countries in transition. This study examines the
pace of fertility change in developing countries that have multiple DHS surveys to
determine whether ongoing transitions are decelerating or stalling. The main findings are
that in sub-Saharan African countries, the average pace of decline in fertility is lower
around 2000 than in the mid-1990s, and more than half the countries in transition in this
region have stalled.

In recent decades fertility has declined at a rapid pace in a majority of developing
countries. Overall, the total fertility rate of the developing world dropped from 6.0 births
per woman in the late 1960s to 2.9 in 2000-2005 (United Nations 2007). Declines have
been most rapid in Asia, North Africa, and Latin America, regions where social and
economic development has also been relatively rapid. Sub-Saharan Africa also
experienced significant declines despite its lagging development. On average, these
changes occurred more rapidly than demographers had expected earlier. This is evident
from the fertility projections made in the 1970s and 1980s, which were generally higher
than the subsequent trends (National Research Council 2000). The most recent
projections made by the United Nations (2007) assume that the fertility levels of
countries that are in transition will continue their decline until fertility drops slightly
below the replacement level.
However, fertility in the developing world declined less rapidly in the 1990s than
in earlier decades, and a few countries (e.g., Bangladesh and Egypt) experienced fertility
stalls or near-stalls in mid-transition (United Nations 2002). The possibility of a pause
during an ongoing fertility transition was first raised in the mid-1980s by Gendell (1985),
but the issue was given little attention until recently because in the past stalls have been
relatively rare. Interest in the topic is now rising as new survey data in additional
countries emerge on stalls in fertility and contraceptive prevalence during the 1990s
(Bongaarts 2006; Eltigani 2003; Ross et al. 2004; Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2007;
United Nations 2002; Westoff and Cross 2006).
The main objective of this study is to analyze recent trends in the pace of the
fertility transitions in developing countries since 1990 to determine whether these
transitions are decelerating and how widespread stalling or near-stalling has become
around 2000. After a description of the data sources, a regional overview of levels and
trends in fertility is provided using estimates from DHS surveys. This is followed by a
more detailed assessment of country-level trends. Country estimates of the pace of
fertility decline are examined separately for a set of 29 countries with three DHS surveys
(which permits analysis of changes in the pace over time) and for a larger set of 40
countries with only two surveys to assess the prevalence of stalling fertility.
DATA
This analysis relies on fertility estimates from countries with multiple DHS
surveys (excluding ex-Soviet republics). For 40 countries at least two such surveys are
available since the early 1990s:
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso,* Cameroon,* Chad, Côte d'Ivoire,*
Ethiopia, Ghana,* Guinea,* Kenya,* Madagascar,* Malawi,* Mali,*
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,* Nigeria, Rwanda,* Senegal,* Tanzania,*
Uganda,* Zambia,* Zimbabwe.*
• Latin America: Bolivia,* Colombia,* Dominican Republic,* Guatemala,*
Haiti,* Nicaragua, Peru.*
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• Asia/North Africa: Bangladesh,* Egypt,* India, Indonesia,* Jordan,*
Morocco,* Nepal,* Philippines,* Turkey, Vietnam, Yemen.
The dates of the surveys vary, with the latest survey conducted around 2003 and
the previous one around 1997, yielding an average interval of 5.8 years between surveys.
In a subgroup of 29 countries a third survey was available, and the years of the
three successive surveys in this subgroup averaged 1992, 1998, and 2004. These
countries are indicated with an asterisk (*) in the above list of country names. The
abbreviations DHS0, DHS-1, and DHS-2 are used to refer, respectively, to the last, next
to last, and second to last DHS surveys. The availability of three surveys permits the
examination of trends during two successive periods: the first period from ca. 1992 to ca.
1998 (between DHS-2 and DHS-1) and the second period from ca. 1998 to ca. 2004
(between DHS-1 and DHS0).
DHS surveys use standardized procedures and questionnaires for collecting
demographic and health data; therefore, estimates of measures from different surveys are
highly comparable. Nevertheless, Eritrea is deliberately excluded here, because the Eritrea
1999 survey was conducted shortly after a war with Ethiopia, and the fertility rate that was
derived from reported births in the three years before this survey was depressed due to the
separation of spouses during this conflict (Blanc 2004). In addition, the 1999 surveys in
Nigeria and the Dominican Republic are not used. The first country report for the 1999
survey in Nigeria presents persuasive evidence of substantial underreporting of events,
resulting in the underestimation of levels of fertility and child mortality (National
Population Commission, Nigeria 2000). The 1999 survey in the Dominican Republic had a
much smaller sample size than is typical for DHS, resulting in unusually large sampling
errors. Fortunately, trends in reproductive behavior in Nigeria and the Dominican Republic
are available from earlier and later DHS surveys conducted in these two countries.
Estimates of fertility as measured by the total fertility rate (TFR) in the three years
before the survey are taken from DHS first country reports (http://www.measuredhs.com/).
The main indicator used below is the pace of fertility decline, defined as the absolute
decline per year in the TFR between two successive observations. Fertility declined over
time in most countries and inter-survey periods, and the corresponding pace is therefore
usually positive. Unless otherwise noted, the determination of statistical significance of
results presented below relies on one-tailed t-tests.
AGGREGATE TRENDS IN FERTILITY
Figure 1 plots regional trends in the (unweighted) average total fertility rate based
on data for the 29 countries with three surveys in sub-Saharan Africa (N=16), Asia/North
Africa (N=7), and Latin America (N=6). For each set of countries three observations are
plotted, giving estimates from successive surveys conducted ca. 1992, ca. 1998, and ca.
2004 (DHS-2, DHS-1, and DHS0). (The distances between years for successive surveys
plotted in Figure 1 are proportional to the average time elapsed between the surveys.)
Average fertility is higher in sub-Saharan African countries than in Asian/North African
and Latin American countries throughout the observed period. Fertility declines are
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evident in all three regions, both in the most recent period (i.e., between DHS-1 and
DHS0) and in the earlier period (i.e., between DHS-2 and DHS-1). In Asia/North Africa
and in Latin America the downward trend is quite steady throughout the two periods, but
in sub-Saharan Africa the decline is slower in the later period compared to the earlier one.
This finding is surprising because fertility declines tend to be most rapid in the early
phases of the transition and to slow down after countries have reached mid-transition
(National Research Council 2000).
These results are confirmed in Figure 2, which plots the (unweighted) average
pace of decline in the TFR for two successive time periods for DHS countries. For each
regional set of countries the first estimate is the pace during the interval between DHS-2
and DHS-1 and the second estimate is for the period between DHS-1 and DHS0. In the
first period the average pace of the TFR decline (in births per woman per year) varied
little from 0.07 in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia/North Africa to 0.08 in Latin America.
For reference, Figure 2 plots a dashed horizontal line at a value of 0.09 births per woman,
which equals the average pace of decline in all developing countries (without China)
between 1965 and 1990 (United Nations 2007). DHS countries in all regions are slightly
(but not significantly) below this past aggregate pace. The results for the earlier period
are therefore unsurprising and consistent with the pace of fertility decline in recent
decades in the developing world overall (excluding China).
In contrast, in the more recent inter-survey interval the average pace of fertility
decline decelerated significantly in sub-Saharan Africa, dropping from 0.07 births per
woman per year in the earlier period to 0.02 in the later period (p<0.05). The change in
pace in Latin America and in Asia/North Africa is much smaller and not statistically
significant. The average pace in the more recent period in Latin America and sub-Saharan
Africa is lower than the average experienced between 1965 and 1990 in the developing
world (excluding China), but the difference is significant only for sub-Saharan Africa.
COUNTRY-LEVEL TRENDS IN FERTILITY
The averages presented in the preceding section conceal wide variations in the
levels and trends of fertility between countries. The analysis now turns to country-level
data and in particular to the country variation in the pace of fertility decline. This section
focuses on the set of 29 countries for which three successive surveys are available, thus
allowing a comparison of the pace between the first two surveys with the pace between
the two most recent surveys. This comparison can therefore shed light on the question of
whether fertility transitions are decelerating.
Table 1 presents the TFR for three points in time and pace estimates for the
corresponding two successive intervals for countries with three surveys. In the first
interval one country (Niger) had a negative pace, which indicates a rise in the TFR, while
in the second interval TFR increases occurred in six countries (Cameroon, Guinea,
Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Tanzania), all in sub-Saharan Africa. It should be emphasized
that small changes in fertility are often not statistically significant. This issue will be
examined further below.
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Figure 3 plots the two successive pace estimates for TFR for all 29 countries with
three surveys. The vertical axis plots the pace during the interval between the second to
last and the next to last surveys, and the horizontal axis plots the pace for the period
between the two most recent surveys. The solid line is the 45-degree diagonal
representing observations for which the pace in the last interval equals the pace in the
next to last interval. Countries located below this diagonal are experiencing a
deceleration in the pace and countries located above the diagonal are experiencing an
acceleration. The dashed line represents the best-fitting line for the observations using an
OLS regression.
This figure leads to two main findings. First, the relationship between the pace
during the last and the next to last survey interval is not statistically significant (p>0.05).1
This relationship either does not exist or is too weak to detect in the available data sets,
which contain inevitable measurement errors. Second, the number of countries below the
diagonal exceeds the number of countries above the diagonal (17 vs. 12), indicating that
deceleration is more prevalent than acceleration.
To determine whether a change in the pace of a country’s fertility decline is
statistically significant, it is necessary to take into account the sampling errors in
estimates. The DHS provides such estimates for the TFR.2 A statistically significant
deceleration in the pace of TFR decline (p<0.05) occurred in four countries: Cameroon,
Ghana, Kenya, and Peru. The presence or absence of a significant deceleration provides
no information about the pace itself, nor does it indicate whether a fertility decline is or is
not different from zero. As shown next, a country can be stalling even though there is no
significant deceleration in the pace.
STALLING FERTILITY
The preceding analysis of changes in the pace of the TFR indicators was limited
to the 29 countries with three DHS surveys. An analysis of the pace for one survey
interval can be undertaken for a larger set of 40 countries with two successive surveys;
for these countries the issue of stalling fertility will be examined.
Table 2 lists the 40 countries with at least two DHS surveys. This set is divided
into two groups depending on whether or not a statistically significant decline in fertility
occurred in the most recent inter-survey period (p<0.05). Among these 40 countries 17
had no significant fertility decline. Notably, two thirds (15/22) of the sub-Saharan
countries show no significant decline, which is a much larger proportion than among
Asian/North African and Latin American countries. Significant fertility declines occurred
in all but one Asian/North African country (Turkey) and in all but one Latin American
country (Guatemala).
The absence of fertility decline is often observed in pre- and post-transitional
countries, but it has been a rare occurrence in countries that are in the midst of a
transition. A period of no decline in countries in transition is usually referred to as a stall
in fertility. A stall implies that an ongoing fertility transition is interrupted by a period of
no significant change in fertility before the country reaches the end of the transition.
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To identify the stallers among the 17 countries with no significant fertility decline
in Table 2, it is necessary to eliminate pre- and post-transitional countries in which the
absence of a decline is not a stall. Countries are generally considered post-transitional
when their fertility reaches the replacement level or below. Only one country falls in this
category: Vietnam, which had a TFR of 1.9 births per woman at the last survey. The
identification of pre-transitional countries is less straightforward. Historical studies often
used a fertility decline of 10 percent from pre-transitional levels as an indication of the
onset of the transition. This approach cannot be used here because historical data are
lacking and the level of pre-transitional fertility cannot be determined accurately. Instead,
it is assumed here that a country is pre-transitional if contraceptive prevalence among
married women is 10 percent or less.3 By this criterion, three countries are pretransitional at the time of the last survey: Chad, Guinea, and Mali. Pre- and posttransitional countries are indicated in parentheses in Table 2.
After excluding the pre- and post-transitional countries, 36 of the 40 countries
remain—these are considered to be in transition. Among these transitional countries 14
(i.e., 39 percent) are in a stall, that is, they did not experience a significant fertility
decline between the two most recent surveys. More than half the sub-Saharan countries in
transition are in a stall (12/19). In accordance with the definition of a stall used here, a
few transitional countries with very small TFR declines (less than about 0.25 births per
woman) are considered to have stalled because these declines are too small to be
statistically significant.
This examination of stalling of the fertility decline was repeated for the earlier
interval between DHS-2 and DHS-1. During this period 9 of 25 transitional countries had
no significant fertility decline: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Haiti, Indonesia, Madagascar, Senegal, and Tanzania. It is noteworthy that all but one of
the countries with a stall in the earlier period experienced a significant TFR decline in the
next period (Tanzania is the exception). But the pace of fertility decline in the intersurvey period following a stall is modest, with an average of 0.07 births per woman per
year for these 9 countries. This is below the average pace of 0.09 for the developing
world (excluding China) between 1965 and 1990. These findings suggest that stalls tend
to be temporary, and that after a stall the pace of fertility decline remains relatively low.
Nevertheless, the number of countries for which a survey is available after a stall is too
small to allow for more definitive conclusions.

CONCLUSION
Nearly all developing countries had high fertility levels in the 1950s. Since then,
most of these countries have experienced substantial declines and a growing number have
reached replacement fertility. The record of fertility trends in the developing world
suggests that once a fertility decline is underway it often continues without significant
interruption until the replacement level of around two births per woman is reached. Stalls
in mid-transition before the 1990s were rare (e.g., in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay).
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This study examined trends in fertility after 1990 using data from DHS surveys.
The main conclusion is that the average pace of fertility decline slowed significantly in
sub-Saharan African countries from the first (ca. 1992 to ca. 1998) to the second (ca.
1998 to ca. 2004) interval between surveys. Two thirds of sub-Saharan countries
experienced no significant decline between the two most recent surveys; even among
countries in transition, more than half are in a stall. In contrast, only one Asian/North
African country and one Latin American country had stalled.
The causes of the slowing pace of fertility change in sub-Saharan Africa were not
examined here, but two factors may have played a role. First, according to conventional
theory, socioeconomic development is a key driver of fertility decline (Bulatao and Lee
1983; Caldwell 1982; Easterlin 1975; Notestein 1953). During the 1990s much of the
world experienced substantial economic growth, but GDP per capita in sub-Saharan
Africa actually declined (World Bank 2005). In addition, life expectancy declined in subSaharan Africa owing to a rapidly spreading AIDS epidemic, while the rest of the world
enjoyed rapid improvements in longevity (United Nations 2007). Poorly performing
economies and rising mortality are plausible contributing factor to the stalling of fertility
in many sub-Saharan countries. Second, the fertility stalls may be attributable in part to
the lower priority assigned to family planning programs in recent years (Blanc and Tsui
2005; Cleland et al. 2006).
The unexpected slow pace of fertility decline around 2000 in sub-Saharan Africa
has implications for future demographic trends, because minor variations in fertility
trends have large effects on the future size and age structure of populations (Casterline
2001). For example, according to the medium variant of the United Nations (2007), the
population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to more than double in size from 769
million in 2005 to 1.76 billion in 2050 (this projection takes into account the large impact
of the AIDS epidemic). The UN’s high variant projection estimates a population of 2.02
billion in 2050 because it assumes a slightly slower pace of fertility decline than the
medium variant (reaching a TFR of 3.0 instead of 2.5 births per woman in 2050). If the
recent slow pace of fertility transition persists, it is conceivable that sub-Saharan Africa’s
population size could approach the high variant. This trend will likely have adverse
effects on the region’s prospects for social and economic development, food security, and
the sustainability of natural resources (Alexandratos 2005; Demeny and McNicoll 2006).
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NOTES
1

Two-tailed t-test.

2

The standard error for the TFR is provided in an appendix to most DHS first
country reports. For a few countries this error was not available and an estimate
was obtained from a regression equation. In this regression the log of the relative
error (LRE) was the dependent variable, and the square root of the number of
respondents (N) and the TFR were the independent variables: LRE= –0.014*N–
0.10*TFR–2.14 (R2=0.55).

3

The threshold of 10 percent for overall contraceptive prevalence is used because on
average it corresponds to a fertility decline of about 10 percent according to
regressions by Ross et al. (2005) and United Nations (2003).
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Table 1: Total fertility rate and pace of fertility decline for 29 countries with three DHS surveys

Country

Total fertility rate
DHS-2
DHS-1
DHS0
ca. 1992
ca. 1998
ca. 2004

Pace of decline
DHS-2 to
DHS-1 to
DHS-1
DHS0

Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

6.5
5.8
5.7
5.2
5.7
5.4
6.1
6.7
7.1
7.4
6.2
6.0
5.8
7.4
6.5
4.3

6.4
4.8
5.2
4.4
5.5
4.7
6.0
6.3
6.7
7.5
5.8
5.7
5.6
6.9
6.1
4.0

5.9
5.0
4.6
4.4
5.7
4.9
5.2
6.0
6.8
7.1
6.1
5.3
5.7
6.9
5.9
3.8

0.02
0.14
0.10
0.16
0.03
0.14
0.02
0.05
0.05
–0.02
0.05
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.10
0.06

0.11
–0.03
0.11
0.00
–0.03
–0.04
0.12
0.08
–0.02
0.05
–0.06
0.05
–0.02
0.00
0.04
0.03

Egypt
Jordan
Morocco
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Nepal
Philippines

3.6
5.6
4.6
3.3
2.9
4.6
4.1

3.5
4.4
4.0
3.3
2.8
4.1
3.7

3.1
3.7
2.5
3.0
2.6
3.1
3.5

0.02
0.17
0.12
0.00
0.03
0.10
0.08

0.08
0.14
0.13
0.07
0.04
0.20
0.04

Bolivia
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Peru

4.8
3.0
3.3
5.5
4.8
3.5

4.2
2.6
3.2
5.1
4.7
2.8

3.8
2.4
3.0
5.0
4.0
2.4

0.15
0.08
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.18

0.08
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.13
0.10

Source: DHS surveys.
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Table 2: Countries by pace of fertility decline between the last two DHS surveys
Pace of decline
No significant
decline

Significant decline*

Sub-Saharan
Africa
Cameroon
(Chad)
Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Ghana
(Guinea)
Kenya
(Mali)
Mozambique
Nigeria
Rwanda
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Asia/
North Africa
Turkey

Benin
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Malawi
Namibia
Niger
Senegal

Bangladesh
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Jordan
Morocco
Nepal
Philippines
Yemen
(Vietnam)

Source: DHS surveys.
Parentheses indicate pre- or post-transitional societies (see text).
*p<0.05, one-tailed t-test.
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Latin America
Guatemala

Bolivia
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Nicaragua
Peru

Figure 1: Unweighted average of country-specific total fertility
rates for three successive DHS surveys
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